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Abstract: The international relations theory of Realism traditionally focuses on the idea that the 
state and its ability to project hard power ultimately determine the status of global geopolitics 
and international security. This idea thus tends not to include issues other than hard power, as 
matters that pertain to state national security. The transition to the 21st century, however, has 
brought forth a rise in non-state actor, transnational threats. Of these, one of the most pressing 
concerns for security analysts is climate change and its impacts to national security. In 
attempting to determine whether or not Realism has adequately adapted to the threat of climate 
change, this research paper evaluates the degree to which climate change has influenced state 
national security policy. The research is underpinned with an evaluation of the various strands 
within the Realist school of thought. The method of research involves a comparative case study 
of Denmark, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The paper identifies the unique challenges 
presented by climate change to each country and assesses their response to these challenges with 
respect to national security policy. The findings of the case study reflect how states are facing 
real threats to security due to climate and suggest that Realism should adapt to this phenomenon 




 My success thus far would not be possible without the support of my wife, Stephanie, and 
my children, Luke and Hannah. In addition, I would like to thank Professor Christine Parthemore 












TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
 
 
1. Front Matter 
a. Title page i 
b. Abstract ii 
c. Table of Contents, with titles and page references iii 
 
2. Text 
a. Introduction 1 
b. Literature Review 3 
I. Climate Change and Conflict: Historical Perspectives  4 
II. Climate Change: A Challenge to IR theory  5 
III. Shortfalls in Current Research   8 
c. Hypothesis and Methods  9 
I. Denmark 11 
II. Saudi Arabia  20 
III. United States  28 
d. Conclusion  36 
 
3. References 
a. Bibliography  39 
b. Appendix 1 47 
 





   
 
  1 
 
 
Climate Change as a Driver of National Security Policy 




 Since the end of the Cold War, some scholars have argued that in addition to military 
adversaries, the national security community should consider environmental threats, and that 
these are an essential component of national security.1 The international relations theory of 
Realism has been resistant to the idea that factors other than the state and its ability to project 
hard power can be classified as national security issues. While there are various strands within 
Realism with competing perspectives, the primary argument of traditional Realist thought is that 
if societal issues that present concern are labeled as “national security threats”, the term national 
security loses its relevancy. The focus of this research is to better understand this issue in the 
context of a specific environmental concern, climate change. The guiding research question asks: 
to what degree have states incorporated climate change into their national security policy?  
 The topic of climate change is an expansive one; for the purposes of this study, the 
timeframe will be limited to a qualitative, comparative case study of Denmark, Saudi Arabia and 
the United States from the years 2000 to 2020. Scholars and policymakers do not consistently 
agree on the definition of the term “national security”, thus defining what constitutes national 
security policy can be a difficult task. Despite varying perspectives, broadly speaking the term 
refers to the safeguarding of a people, territory, and way of life. This includes protection from 
 
1 Gareth Porter. “Environmental security as a national security issue.” Current History. May 1995. Vol. 94. No. 592. 
218. 
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physical assault and is thus synonymous with the term, “defense.”2 For this paper, the term 
“national security” will use a framework that draws not only on the idea of safeguarding the 
resources, population and territory of a country from external threats, but also includes protection 
from transnational threats in support of the stability and prosperity of a given nation.3 The 
operationalization of climate change into policy will be viewed through three categories: public 
statements by cabinet members and above within respective governments, financial investments 
into green initiatives, as well as formally articulated national security policy and laws, within 
each respective country. Simple enumeration of these points of measurement in each country 
would not be a definitive indicator of climate change as an influencer of policy. Qualitative 
comparison of leadership intent, financial commitment, and binding national authorities, 
however, illustrate the cumulative socio-political evolution of each nation considered here. In 
assessing state response to climate change, analysis will be given as to whether or not the school 
of thought that places state power and national security above all else, Realism, has adequately 
adapted to the threats posed by climate change.  
 A review of the current literature indicates that there are essentially two facets within the 
Realist school in relationship to this question. The primary emphasizes hard power capabilities 
and a state’s ability to defeat an adversary through kinetic means. The secondary facet 
recognizes that the modern security environment involves elements other than hard power as 
national security threats, and thus must be factored into the Realist mode of thought. These 
differing perspectives present two hypotheses to test. The first is that states will continue to focus 
on traditional Realist issues and thus shape national security policy by determining their ability 
 
2 Michael J. Meese, Suzanne C. Nielsen and Rachel M. Sondheimr. American National Security, 7th ed. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 3. 
 
3 Ibid. 3-5.  
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to respond to threats posed by other state actors. The second is that with the consideration of the 
threats posed by climate change, states will include climate change in their national security 
planning.  
 While the words “climate” and “climate change” have more agreement in the vernacular 
than security terms, this research study will adhere to straight-forward definitions, specifically 
with “climate” as “the average course or condition of weather at a place usually over a period of 
years as exhibited by temperature, wind velocity and precipitation,” 4 while “climate change” 
refers to the rise in global temperatures associated with the burning of fossil fuels since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution.5  The dependent variable being measured is the degree to 
which a state has incorporated climate change into its national security policy, measured as 
described above. A state’s behavior regarding climate change is influenced by several factors, 
from its geographic location, energy resource production and consumption rates, as well as the 
evolution of its political culture. As independent variables, this research will be restricted to the 
differences in the relationship between each country’s economic and industrial base, the climate 
effects of its geographical location, and it’s flexibility to adapt to change.  
 
Literature Review  
 There is a significant body of scientific and political writing on climate change and it’s 
implications for national security studies. This literature review will trace the arc of that writing 
from identifying the origins of the climate change discussion, facilitating a deeper understanding 
of the evolution of ideas surrounding the nexus of environment and security. Moving into 
 
4 Merriam-Webster, “Climate,” accessed 22 March, 2020, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/climate 
 
5 United Nations, “Climate Change”, accessed 20 March, 2020,  https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/climate-change/ 
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international relations theory, it will expose the challenges of integrating climate change into a 
Realist worldview, as Realism is the theory that emphasizes the state’s ability to defend itself, 
and national security above all other policy. Finally, this review will address the shortfalls in 
current literature that this research study addresses.  
Climate Change and Conflict: Historical Perspectives 
 While this research will focus on the years 2000-2020, scholarship on climate change as a 
defense issue traces its origins back to the Colonial era and the Civil War period, thus extending 
beyond the current definition of climate change beginning with the Industrial Revolution. 
Historian James Roger Fleming discusses how Colonialists viewed warming the climate through 
deforestation as a positive effort in establishing a new society, in which a warmer climate would 
benefit industry and agriculture.6  Civil War historian Brian Allen Drake is one of the few who 
has assessed how climate and the environment affected battlefield outcomes. While traditional 
military historians tend to focus on tactics, strategy, and combat leadership as the only relevant 
factors to military history, Drake highlights how a changing environment during the Civil War 
changed combat outcomes.7  
 
 The issue of attempting to change the climate to support defense initiatives arose in the 
Cold War. Fleming has written extensively on mankind’s ability to manipulate environmental 
conditions and its impact to security issues with his book, Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History 
 
6 James Roger Fleming, Historical Perspectives on Climate Change, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 7-
8. 
 
7 Brian Allen Drake. The Blue, The Gray, and the Green: Toward an Environmental History of the Civil War. 
(Athens University Press, 2015),18. 
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of Weather and Climate Control.8 This work however, is more a discussion of weather 
manipulation and discusses Soviet and U.S. efforts to “weaponize” the weather during the Cold 
War through cloud seeding, than it is about modern day security implications of climate change.9 
In recent years, however, defense officials have begun to understand how the impacts of climate 
change can negatively affect defense readiness, as discussed in the following section.  
Climate Change: a Challenge to IR Theory 
  
 Climate change is a global societal issue. Its impacts permeate into a plethora of scholarly 
fields. Traditional IR theory however, has not yet determined its place within their frameworks. 
Because the links between climate change and national security are a recent concept, the school 
which places national security and hard power above all else in its doctrine--Realism, has not 
adequately addressed the issue of climate change.10 The topic has tended to be considered a 
concern of liberalism and institutionalists who believe the problem must be addressed through 
international agreements, environmental initiatives, legislation, and robust international 
cooperation. With military leaders and security practitioners becoming more concerned about 
climate change and its impacts to security, as well as military readiness, it becomes increasingly 
difficult for Realists to avoid the topic and still maintain relevancy in international relations (IR) 
scholarship.  
 There are some scholars who have recently contributed analysis as to how climate change 
could be viewed through a Realist’s lens. In his article for the Center for Geopolitics & Security 
in Realism Studies, Daniel Heffron discusses the perspectives of the various strands of Realism 
 
8 James Roger Fleming, Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010). 170. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Daniel Heffron. “What do realists think about climate change?” Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism 
Studies. November 13, 2015. 7. Accessed 1 March, 2020. http://cgsrs.org/publications/30 
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and concludes that the school has not effectively addressed the issue and that most strands within 
the IR framework cannot be applied to the climate problem. He does offer however, that 
Defensive Realism, is a potential theory which could be applied, specifically within Walt’s 
theory of balance. Though each state would be acting in their own self-interest, alliances aimed 
at addressing climate change would promote the relative security of each.11 Heffron provides a 
primer for his analysis by first defining the various strands of Realism and their modes of 
thought. He additionally includes a section to define and explain what climate change is. With 
this straight-forward approach, his work is able to be consumed by the environmentalist or 
scientist wishing to understand how to think as some policymakers or military leaders do, so as 
to influence their decision-making on climate issues. Likewise, he provides the classical Realist 
theorist an overview of climate change and the real security concerns it poses.  
 Jonathan Symons differs from Heffron in that he assesses that the risks associated with 
climate change can be brought into classical Realism’s perspective. To premise his research, he 
asks the question, “But how does Realism respond when the prudent pursuit of state security 
risks rendering much of the planet uninhabitable?”12 Symons draws a parallel between the 
climate problem and the early pursuits of nuclear weapons, citing that the development of the 
hydrogen bomb in the 1950’s created the same type of dilemma as status quo politics now 
carried a significant risk of thermonuclear omnicide.13 Morgenthau’s response to this dilemma 
was to shift the parameters of classical Realism, to include states working in concert to manage 
 
11 Ibid, 17-18. 
 
12 Jonathan Symons. “Realist climate ethics: Promoting climate ambition within the Classical Realist tradition,” 
Review of International Studies, Volume 45, Issue 1, January 2019, 141-160. Accessed 1 March  
 
13 Ibid, 143.  
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risks and safeguard collective national interests.14 Symons adopts Morgenthau’s line of thought 
with respect to climate change and concludes that states’ perceptions of national interest must 
include cooperative system-preservation alongside traditional security concerns.15  
 Traditional Realist thought is centered on military capabilities, kinetic threats and the 
ability to respond to them, thus the critique of many classical Realists in labeling climate change 
as a national security concern is that it devalues the definition of a “security threat,” and thus 
risks failing to prioritize actual threats. This idea, referred by many as “securitization”, is likely a 
point of criticism many classical Realists would have regarding Symons’ work. It appears as if 
Symons does not wish to delve away from belonging in the traditional Realist school, so simply 
changes the standards as opposed to accepting other strands that might be more suitable to 
embracing climate change. In this regard, Heffron demonstrates a greater degree of adaptability 
and caters to Realist thinkers willing to do the same. 
 In his article “Rebranding Climate Change: From a Realist Perspective” for The 
International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses, 16 Bayard Rogers asserts that 
definitive, collective societal action in mitigating the risks of climate change is impeded by 
inconsequential debate over terminology, political correctness, and political and moral 
philosophies that emphasize individual autonomy and equal opportunity. He further argues that 
the focus on individual rights prevents societal change that is needed to combat climate change, 
in that scientists and politicians are a minority of the population, and their conversation excludes 




15 Ibid, 151. 
 
16 Bayard Rogers. 2019. "Rebranding Climate Change: From a Realist Perspective." The International Journal of 
Climate Change: Impacts and Responses 11 (4): 33-44. doi:10.18848/1835-7156/CGP/v11i04/33-44. 
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only social change can adequately adapt to the environmental threat. Though his thoughts are 
categorized as a Realist philosophy, his focus on social change is indicative of a liberal ideal. 
This article seems slanted as an argument against the domestic concept of liberalism, rather than 
international relations theory.  
 In looking at Maria Trombetta’s analysis of the discourse surrounding climate change, 
the debate regarding whether or not Realist theory is failing to adapt to climate change or 
whether climate advocates are failing to present the issue in a manner that makes sense to Realist 
thinkers is again brought forth with the argument of “securitization” of terms. Trombetta claims 
that attempts to broaden the security agenda have been perceived as spreading the 
confrontational logic of security.17 She argues that critics of including non-traditional sectors into 
matters of national security fail to consider if or how alternative security logics are introduced 
and whether practices associated with securitization are equally challenged or changed.18 Her 
analysis thus objectively challenges both traditional Realism as well as those that would be eager 
to “securitize” issues they deem a priority, but might not actually be at the level of national 
security concerns.   
 
Shortfalls in Current Scholarship and Future Research 
 Current literature reflects a trend towards the integration of climate change as a national 
security threat. While historically, some viewed the ability to change the climate as an 
opportunity, the current climate trend in rising temperatures is finding a foothold even in the 
Realist perspective. There is still some debate as to whether the characterization of 
 
17 Maria Julia Trombetta. “Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse.” Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, 21:4, 585-602, DOI: 10.1080/09557570802452920, 585-586 
 
18 Ibid. 
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environmental issues as security issues dilutes the definition of security, however.  Future 
research will likely evolve into calls for collective societal action, whether from defense 
officials, scientists or national policy-makers. This kind of consensus would be similar to the 
sacrifices made during World War II or the nuclear attack drills of the Cold War, as well as the 
current “social distancing” required to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.19 With quickly 
changing temperatures impacting everything from wildfires throughout the country of Australia 
to an increase in hurricanes in the Caribbean, it is crucial to elevate the climate crisis with a 
united voice across disciplines. This research will use a comparative case study to evaluate the 
degree to which three key nations have integrated climate change as a security concern. 
 
Hypothesis and Methods: Comparative Case Studies 
 The following case studies will test the hypotheses that states will continue to focus on 
traditional security issues as defined by Realism, or will include climate change into their 
national security policy formulation. In reviewing three cases, it will further explore whether 
state behaviors indicate a leaning towards one of the above-mentioned hypotheses. Regardless of 
current state action in response to climate change, the data might suggest that climate change 
ought to be considered a national security issue and that if so, the IR theory of Realism ought to 
achieve consensus as to where the issue of climate change belongs within their theoretical 
framework.  
 These comparative case studies will evaluate the national security policies of Denmark, 
Saudi Arabia and the United States from the turn of the 21st century to the present, with the aim 
of determining the degree to which climate change has been incorporated into state national 
 
19 Kaitlyn Tiffany, “The Dos and Don’ts of ‘Social Distancing’, 12 March, 2020. The Atlantic. Accessed 20 March, 
2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-what-does-social-distancing-mean/607927/ 
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security policy. While climate change is a global problem with impacts that span across a 
multitude of research areas, this case is bound by a selection of three states and the specific 
climate challenges faced by each. Some scientific data pertaining to climate change will be 
referenced, however, the intent of the research is to provide robust qualitative analysis rather 
than quantitative data regarding climate related events.  
 Certain geopolitical and geographical factors were considered in selecting these cases and 
the significance these factors have in global and regional affairs. Denmark has historically played 
a relatively minor role on the international stage, yet been driven into a regional leadership role 
due to its sovereignty of Greenland. As the Arctic becomes a region of increasing interest to 
global powers such as Russia and China, this ethnically homogenous democratic state is forced 
to action. Saudi Arabia plays an important role geopolitically for regional stability in the Middle 
East, and is adapting a new state strategic plan for the 21st century, which entails revisions to 
energy and socioeconomic policies, aimed at supporting a growing population in an ever-
warming region. With a powerful monarchy, however, these actions are easier to control. The 
United States maintains global influence and power, and also encounters a variety of climate 
related events due to its geographic size and location. Domestic political polarization has also 
muddied the waters for U.S. security policy. The objective with these case choices is to assess 
states facing different types of climate change concerns in various regions, all with variant 
degrees of international influence and governing styles. This allows for a diversified qualitative 




  11 
Denmark 
 Although climate change related events are occurring globally at an increasing rate, these 
events are all in some way an effect of the changing conditions in the Arctic region.20 The Arctic 
essentially serves as ground zero in terms of climate change, with increasing temperatures 
resulting in rapid sea and glacial ice melt, causing global sea level rise (SLR) and drastic changes 
to environmental conditions, not only in the Arctic, but throughout the world. States with claims 
to Arctic territory are therefore gaining the interest of scientists, strategists, and policymakers. 
Denmark’s territory of Greenland allows it to hold membership status in the Arctic Council, an 
eight-nation diplomatic institution comprised of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The council is aimed at facilitating international 
cooperation as the region opens up to resource extraction and trade avenues due to melting ice 
increasing access to previously inaccessible waterways.21 Greenland’s coastlines and 
surrounding ocean territory are believed to hold billions of barrels of untapped oil and billions of 
cubic meters of untapped natural gas.22 Ice melt in the region is an effect of increased 
temperatures due to rising carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and with glacial sheets evaporating or 
disappearing altogether, states are vying for Greenland’s rich resources.23 As a relatively minor 
player in the international arena, Denmark is not accustomed to posturing against or negotiating 
with power players such as Russia and China, but both of these nations are already pursuing 
 
20 J Richter-Menge, J.E. Overland, and J.T. Mathis, eds.“Arctic Report Card 2016: Arctic Change--So what; 
Linkages and Changes.” National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration. December 2016. Washington, D.C. 
ftp://ftp.oar.noaa.gov/arctic/documents/Arctic ReportCard_full_report2016.pdf.  Accessed November 29, 2017. 
 
21 Arctic Council, “Arctic Council at COP23: Climate Change in the Arctic and its Global Impacts.” October 20, 
2017, www.arctic-council.org. 
 
22 Michael T. Klare, The Race for What’s Left: the global scramble for the world’s last resources, (New York: 
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interests in the region. Although China does not hold Arctic territory and is therefore not an 
Arctic Council member, it is particularly interested in cornering Greenland’s resource market 
and sent representatives to scope energy resource extraction sites.24 China’s interest in the region 
will only complicate a sensitive situation of geopolitical friction, as all Arctic Council states are 
already engaged in unresolved territorial disputes with Russia.25  
 All Arctic Council member states have demonstrated interests in the region.26 Denmark, 
however presents a particularly interesting case to study in that it is taking an active role in terms 
of international cooperation and defending national interests in the region. Denmark’s territory in 
Greenland and its relations with indigenous Arctic communities have given the state a significant 
role in addressing climate and security concerns in the Arctic. Changes occurring in Greenland, 
and its surrounding oceanic territory, present a number of challenges and opportunities for the 
international community. These changes give Denmark a key responsibility to defend its 
interests and maintain cooperation with the native population of Greenland, while simultaneously 
negotiating with major powers such as Canada, the United States, Russia, and China. In 
assessing Denmark’s national security policy surrounding climate change, it is necessary to look 




24 Tim Boersma and Kevin Foley, “The Greenland Gold Rush: Promise and Pitfalls of Greenland’s Energy and 
Mineral Resources,” Energy Security Initiative at Brookings; John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. 
September, 2014. 45-47. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24-greenland-energy-mineral-
resources-boersma-foley-pdf-2.pdf. Accessed March 4, 2020.  
 
25 Ibid, 88-99. 
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Arctic Climate Trends 
 A 2004 assessment published by the Arctic Council showed alarming rates of warming 
trends in the Arctic with results surpassing original predictions of the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC).27 Some scientific estimates predict the Arctic region will become ice-
free by 2040. This is decades earlier than previously predicted.28 While there are regional 
variations, evidence shows a clear and persistent increase in temperatures across the Arctic. Up 
from an observed temperature increase of 5 to 7 degrees Fahrenheit over the past fifty years, the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) predicts an increase in ambient air temperatures of 5 
to 9 degrees Fahrenheit over land and up to 13 degrees Fahrenheit over ocean within the next one 
hundred years.29 Aside from the scientific community, various defense entities have dedicated 
more attention to climate change in recent years due to its implications on security and stability. 
The United States Office of Naval Research examined 30 different global climate models to 
account for various research methods and variables. All models indicated a loss of sea ice 
increase in the Arctic.30 Four scenarios observed demonstrated increase in surface temperatures 
for the next 20-50 years versus a set of 36 models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project (CMIP5) from 1966 through 2005.31 Reviews and assessments of climate change impacts 
 
27 Elizabeth L. Chalecki, “He Who Would Rule: Climate Change in the Arctic and its Implications for U.S. National 
Security,” Journal of Public and International Affairs (Princeton University), Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs, 1 March 2007, Accessed 22 March, 2020, https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/2007-
10.pdf, 208. 
 




30 James E. Overland, Muyin Wang, and John Welsche. “Future Arctic Climate Changes: Adaptation and Mitigation 
Time Scales.” National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration. Research number: 10.1002/2013EF00162. August 
21, 2013. www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/future/bib/EarthsFutureJEO.pdf, accessed November 28, 2017.  
 
31 Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5), World Climate Research Programme, 2008, Accessed 20 
March, 2020, https://www.wcrp-climate.org/wgcm-cmip/wgcm-cmip5 
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have been gathered by and shared amongst the scientific and defense communities. The 
information from them provides conclusive evidence indicating it is not if, but how, climate 
change in the Arctic will shape Denmark’s national defense priorities. The changing 
environmental conditions are resulting in great power competition over resources and territory 
belonging to Denmark. In addition, Denmark is concerned about impacts to native populations in 
Greenland.  
Denmark Policy  
Statements:  
 Statements from government representatives and leaders do not always translate to direct 
policy implementation. However, statements regarding a government’s intentions in addressing 
climate change can be indicative of certain policy priorities. Upon becoming Denmark’s new 
prime minister in 2019, Mette Frederiksen vowed to cut 70 percent of her country’s carbon 
emissions by 2030.32 In a 2014 statement at the UN Climate Summit, then Danish Prime 
Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt vowed to reduce emissions by 40 percent by 2020, be fossil 
free by 2050, and stated Denmark would be actively working to enhance climate finance.33 
Denmark has fallen short of this goal as of early 2020, only achieving a 29 percent reduction, 
however, the Danish Energy and Climate Outlook projects the country is on track to accomplish 
 
32 Martin Selsoe Sorenson, “Denmark’s New Prime Minister Vows to Tackle Climate Change.” The New Your 
Times, 26 June, 2019, accessed 2 March, 2020. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/europe/denmark-prime-minister-mette-frederiksen.html 
 
33 Helle Thorning-Schmidt, Statement by Denmark at the UN Climate Summit, 23 September, 2014, accessed 2 
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this goal in 203034. A 2011 Arctic Strategy released by Denmark outlined a comprehensive 
agenda towards the entire Arctic region. Prior to this, the country’s Arctic outlook tended to 
focus solely on Greenland.35 At a UN Private Sector Forum, former Prime Minister, H.E. Lars 
Lokke Rasmussen gave a speech in which he emphasized the need for investment into climate 
change technologies, and the role public-private partnerships would have in bringing about 
changes that could foster a “global green economy.”36 In 2019, Denmark’s climate and energy 
minister, Dan Jorgensen, stated Denmark plans to construct an offshore wind island that could 
power as many as 10 million European homes. Jorgensen added, “If we really are to realize the 
enormous potential of offshore wind we must develop technologies of the future to convert the 
green power into fuel for aircraft, ships and industry.”37 In its 2017-2018 Foreign and Security 
Policy Strategy, Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims it will address the security policy 
challenges associated with extensive new opportunities for development of the Arctic region. It 
further claims the Danish government will strengthen its embassy in Moscow to ensure stronger 
representation of Danish interests, particularly regarding security policy and the Arctic.38 
Attempts to strengthen diplomatic relations with Russia are a worthy endeavor for Denmark, 
 
34 Danish Energy Agency, “Denmark’s Energy and Climate Outlook 2019,” October 2019, Accessed 22 March, 
2020, https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/Analyser/deco19.pdf 
 
35 Marc Jacobson, “Denmark’s strategic interests in the Arctic: It’s the Greenlandic connection, stupid!,” The Arctic 
Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, (May 4, 2016), accessed 22 March, 2020.  
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/denmark-interests-arctic-greenland-connection/ 
 
36 Prime Minister’s Office, Denmark. Statement by H.E. Lars Lokke Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, at the 
United Nations Private Sector Forum. Accessed 2 March, 2020. http://www.stm.dk/_p_13250.html 
 
37 Jacobsen, Stine. “Denmark plans 30 billion offshore wind island that could power 10 million homes.” Reuters. 10 




38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, “Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018,” (June 2017): 26, 
accessed 23 March, 2020, https://um.dk/en/news/NewsDisplayPage/?newsID=0D9827F1-0ADB-443B-9741-
CA265A1E4EBF 
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given Russia’s territorial claims in the region. Moscow has claimed the Lomonosov and 
Mendeleyev Ridges, extensions of the Russian continental shelf. Denmark and Canada also 
claim the Lomonosov Ridge as extensions of their respective continental shelves. The 
adjudication of these claims is a significant security issue, as the ridges pass closely to the 
geographic North Pole and would dramatically expand the mineral extraction zone for whichever 
state had control of extraction rights on them. Claims by Russia were submitted to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in December of 2001, arguing that a 
large portion of the Arctic ocean floor was an extension of Russian territory. Despite an updated 
submission in 2015, a final decision on these claims has not been made.39  
Investments: 
 Per its stated emphasis on public-private partnerships, in 2014 Denmark announced the 
Danish Climate Investment Fund, which will be used to finance climate friendly projects in 
developing countries.40 The investment firm invests in green energy projects around the world, 
so is not a project solely focused on the Arctic, demonstrating Denmark’s commitment to 
combating climate change more broadly.41 This year, Denmark also announced its launch of the 
Danish Agribusiness Fund. The Fund will invest capital in projects in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and parts of Europe. Danish officials state the fund will be operated on market 
 
39 United Nations Oceans and Law of the Sea, accessed 22 March, 2020. 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm 
 
40 Prime Minister, Ms. Helle Thorning-Schmidt, “Statement by Denmark at the UN Climate Summit, 23 September, 




41 Introduction to the Danish Climate Investment Fund, 19 November 2015, Danish Climate Investment Fund, 
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conditions and will ensure the investors a competitive return. CEO of PendsionDenmark, Torben 
Möger Pedersen claims the two funds demonstrate that the best form of development aid is 
business.42 As part of its offshore wind energy project, Denmark has set aside 65 million crowns 
to research how the energy coming into the hub can be stored or converted into renewable 
hydrogen as all the power generated will not just be used by domestic customers.43  
Legislation: 
 Complimentary to Denmark’s public statements and financial investments into climate 
initiatives is legislation, demonstrating the government’s level of commitment on the climate 
issue. Denmark recently approved its national Climate Act, which targets reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions by 70 percent by 2030.44  This legally binding act is one of the world’s most 
ambitious. The law establishes a mechanism for setting milestone targets. Every five years the 
government must set a legally binding target with a ten-year perspective and emissions are 
calculated in accordance with UN accounting rules.45 While this legislation targets Denmark’s 
broader strategy at becoming a greener society, legal efforts focused on the Arctic include 
Denmark’s signatory status to the 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
 
42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. “New Danish Agribusiness Fund to invest millions in developing 
countries.”Accessed 2 March, 2020.  https://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=6e524580-7b2a-409e-a8c9-
499888e96f48 
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(UNCLOS) and the 2008 Illulissat Declaration, an agreement with five coastal states of the 
Arctic Ocean undertook to foster cooperation in developing the region under international law.46 
Other Initiatives: 
 Aside from legal and financial commitments, Denmark is embracing a number of 
strategic initiatives, indicating the country is implementing a whole of government approach to 
climate change and interests in the Arctic. The Danish Foreign Ministry office has established its 
Office for the Arctic and North America and in 2012 gave its senior Arctic official the title of 
‘Arctic Ambassador.’47 In a bold move in 2014, Denmark submitted data to the UN Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) claiming a territory of 895,000 square kilometers 
of seabed in the Arctic Ocean. This equates to approximately 19 times the present area of 
Denmark and nearly half of Greenland. The claim also includes the North Pole and has 
significant overlaps with Russia’s claims.48 In its Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020, the Danish 
government announces the country’s “strategic realm,” 49 consisting of the nation of Denmark, 
the Faroe Islands, and Greenland.  
National Security Policies: 
 Denmark has embraced a multi-faceted and ambitious agenda with respect to climate 
change as a whole. While many of its initiatives are focused on holistic societal efforts, its stated 
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policies regarding the Arctic are geared towards national security interests. Denmark is member 
of the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and played an integral role in the 2015-2018 
NORDEFCO Action Plan, which discusses joint training and military exercises amongst Nordic 
partner states, to include Arctic exercises.50 Unlike the Arctic Council, which focuses on 
diplomatic cooperation and joint scientific research in the Arctic, NORDEFCO is a political and 
military alliance, consisting of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.51 Denmark also 
holds membership in the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (NORA), consisting of the Faroe Islands, 
Greenland, Iceland and Norway.52 NORA’s role is aimed at fostering political agreements more 
so than national defense interests but is included as an important facet of Denmark’s holistic 
Arctic Strategy (2011-2018), published by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.53 As part of its 
international cooperation initiatives in the Arctic, Denmark ratified UNCLOS in 2004, but it was 
not until 2008 that there was on observed increase in security policy initiatives, as irrefutable 
evidence of a warming Arctic was gaining momentum.54 In addition to being signatory to 
UNCLOS, the Illussat Declaration serves as agreement between Arctic states to resolve conflicts 
through dialogue and negotiations within the framework of international law.55 The Danish 
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Defense Agreement (2010-2014) involves a stronger focus on the tasks of the Danish Armed 
Forces in the Arctic.56 
 The Kingdom’s Arctic strategy calls for the formation of a joint-service Arctic Command 
and the establishment of an Arctic response force to improve defense readiness and response 
capability in the region.57  Another strategic priority set forth in the strategy is a comprehensive 
analysis of the armed forces future tasks in the Arctic, which includes an assessment on Thule 
Air Base potentially playing a larger role in regard to defense in Greenland by the Danish Armed 
Forces in cooperation with other partner countries.58 An objective aimed at fostering stronger ties 
with Greenland’s native population is the recruitment and training of Greenland citizens by 
Danish defense forces.59 Given the data presented, Denmark’s national security policy is 
adapting to the effects of climate change, integrating this concern into its national security 
formulation, particularly as it pertains to the Arctic.   
 
Saudi Arabia 
 Saudi Arabia plays a significant role on the international stage. Its energy, economic, and 
security policies can impact Middle Eastern regional stability, and have macroeconomic and 
international security effects, due to its role as one of the leading global exporters of oil. While 
Saudi Arabia’s oil industry has contributed to the state’s vast amount of wealth, it has also 
resulted in its national economy being largely dependent on a fossil fuel resource. The world’s 
demand for oil and consumption of fossil fuels is a leading contributor to human induced climate 
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change. The demand for oil however, is the leading driver of Saudi Arabia’s rich economy. 
Despite the wealth accumulated through its oil exportation, Saudi Arabia now faces serious 
economic and social stability problems due to its reliance on oil as a means of geopolitical power 
and economic growth, as well as the climatological problems it now faces.  
Saudi Climate Trends  
 Due to its geographical location and climatological conditions, Saudi Arabia is an oil 
rich, but water poor state.  Water scarcity presents threats and challenges to the Kingdom’s 
agricultural industry and overall threats to social stability in terms of ensuring its citizens have 
clean water and electricity. Water scarcity is increasing due to the effects of climate change. 
IPCC projections from the mid 2000’s predicted a decrease in annual rainfall in the Arabian 
Peninsula and an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme events and in recent years, 
the Peninsula has experienced an increase in warm spells, droughts, flash floods and storm 
surges.60 Increases in temperature, decreases in precipitation, or changes in their variability may 
adversely affect climactic conditions in the state. Changing conditions may have serious 
consequences in the area of water supply for agricultural, domestic, and municipal use.61 Wealth 
from oil production does not equate to social stability for the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia is impacted 
more than most countries in the world from recent negative climactic factors, mainly very high 
temperatures and very low precipitation.62 In terms of water supply, it is one of the driest and 
poorest countries in the world and is surrounded by countries already confronted by water supply 
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problems.63 These issues are compounded by the fact that Saudi Arabia has one of the highest 
population growth rates in the world, with an average annual population growth increase of 7.2 
percent.64 This will only increase the demand for both water and basic utilities in the state.  With 
population growth, water demand can only be expected to increase as the temperature 
increases.65 Along with its water scarcity dilemma, which could affect internal stability, Saudi 
Arabia faces potential energy and economic problems due to international attitudes on climate 
change, as many countries are seeking ways to be less dependent on fossil fuels and operate 
under renewable energy resources, thus presenting potential economic blows to Saudi Arabia’s 
revenue from oil. This study will examine the measures Saudi Arabia is undertaking in the wake 
of climate change’s impact to water supply and the potential internal and regional security 
implications water scarcity presents for the Kingdom. It will also examine the degree to which 
Saudi Arabia is adjusting to oil consuming countries seeking alternative energy resources as a 
means to combat the negative effects of climate change. 
Saudi Arabia Policy 
Statements: 
 Despite climate change causing economic and stability concerns for Saudi Arabia, the 
state has gained a reputation internationally as being opposed to initiatives aimed at reducing 
harmful energy use practices. Some scholars are labeling Saudi Arabia as the ultimate 
obstructionist when it comes to developing solutions to the global climate problem, due to the 
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economy.66 As the second highest exporter of oil globally, Saudi Arabia holds influence over the 
entire OPEC community. It can thus be assumed that official OPEC statements are not formed 
without the input or direct guidance of Saudi Arabia. OPEC has claimed that climate mitigation 
policies and measures that target oil consumption will slow growth in their revenues from oil 
exports. They have argued that reducing emissions through carbon taxes (or equivalent 
measures) in developed countries will reduce global demand for oil and thus the global price of 
oil.67 In 2004, the Kingdom reluctantly announced it would accede to the Kyoto Protocol, aimed 
at stemming climate change. Upon this announcement however, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources added that he predicted by 2010, Saudi Arabia would “lose at 
least 19 billion dollars as a result of the policies industrialized nations would adopt to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions.”68 Saudi Arabia’s government also seeks to appear as a 
supporter of developing nations, claiming that the largest contributors to climate change 
(developed, industrialized nations), are doing little to reduce the threat, yet imposing burdensome 
requirements on still developing countries.69  
Investments: 
 Despite the threats that climate change mitigation poses to the Saudi economy and thus 
its national interest, the state does acknowledge it faces its own environmental problems that 
must be dealt with. The Kingdom has invested in dam/reservoir systems with the intent to store 
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water and reuse waters in an energy efficient manner.70 Realizing that such a large portion of the 
country’s water use was due to inefficient agricultural practices, Saudi Arabia also adopted a 
food supply exchange program in 2011. The program calls for the Saudi Agricultural and 
Livestock Investment Company (SALIC) to work with the Canadian Wheat Board, ensuring a 
portion of its grains will go to Saudi Arabia. Twelve additional arrangements have been 
implemented to outsource food production to developing countries to both aid in their economic 
development and reduce demand for water in Saudi Arabia’s agricultural sector.71  
 The major socioeconomic strategy driving Saudi Arabia’s whole of government approach 
to energy and economic issues is the government’s Vision 2030. This initiative presents the 
Kingdom’s plans to diversity its economy to become less reliant on oil exports.72 While it 
includes measures that could contribute to decelerating harmful energy production practices, 
these efforts are not directly tied to concerns about climate change. Rather, investments into 
renewable energy projects stem from concerns about the oil market and encouraging foreign 
investment into a Saudi solar sector. The drop in oil prices in recent years dealt a significant 
blow to Saudi Arabia’s public finances, due to oil still accounting for roughly 90 percent of the 
kingdom’s export revenue.73 Furthermore, the Saudi government is seeking means of preserving 
its oil due to increased domestic consumption, and thus is not developing renewable energy with 
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the intent of decreasing its own oil consumption.74 Interest in solar power started with the 2010 
establishment of the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CA.R.E.). It 
currently sets an initial target of producing 9.5 gigawatts (GW) of power from renewable energy 
under the “King Salman Renewable Energy Initiative.”75 Vision 2030 sets wide-ranging, 
ambitious socioeconomic goals. Analysts are skeptical of the Kingdom’s ability to achieve them 
due to the hurdles it faces restructuring its government and implementing socioeconomic reform. 
After decades of a rigid societal structure that did not require a large domestic workforce or a 
population with the education and skillsets needed to implement alternative energy industries, 
the country will be hard-pressed to recruit and train a robust domestic work force and still 
achieve the goals it sets forth, without relying on foreign labor. Utilizing foreign labor however, 
would detract from the government’s promises of social and economic reform aimed at 
improving the lives of Saudi citizens.76 
Legislation: 
 Saudi Arabia has revised its general environmental laws and the rules for their 
implementation to be consistent with Article 32 of the nation’s constitution. The revisions state:  
“The State shall endeavor to preserve, protect and improve the environment and prevent its 
pollution; Protect public health from activities and acts that harm the environment; Conserve 
and develop natural resources; Include environmental planning as an integral part of overall 
development planning in all industrial, agricultural, architectural and other areas; Raise 
awareness of environmental issues and strengthen individual and collective feelings regarding 
the sole and collective responsibility for preserving and improving the environment and 
encouraging national voluntary efforts; Address various types of environmental violations and 
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appropriate penalties for protecting the human health from pollution both at present and in the 
future.”77  
 
These are broad and relatively difficult goals to measure at present. However, there are some 
concrete actions indicating a changing attitude towards climate change, while they are not 
written in legislation.   
Other Initiatives: 
 In 2007, Saudi Arabia hosted the Third OPEC Summit, in which environmental concerns 
were featured as one of the primary topical areas to be discussed. Despite Saudi Arabia’s 
obstructionist tendencies to climate change reform, the consensus following the Summit 
displayed a clear acceptance of human induced climate change, and the responsibility of OPEC 
countries to address the problem.78 Saudi Arabia has since promoted an energy-related income 
generation method known as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).79 Many regional oil producers 
have since promoted CCS as part of the post-Kyoto agreement.80 This water conservation 
method has broader applications, demonstrating that Saudi Arabia and other OPEC nations are 
taking measures to contribute climate change’s challenges. Another technology of interest to the 
Saudis involves the use of natural slopes to transport water via pipes to storage, versus the use of 
pumps.81 
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National Security Policies: 
 This research indicates there is a limited amount of publicly available literature on Saudi 
Arabian national security strategy. While there is significant literature on the issues of water 
scarcity and climate change’s impact to Saudi Arabia, there is no specific linkage between 
climate change and Saudi national security policy in the literature reviewed. In regard to 
comprehensive climate change policies, Saudi has traditionally been far less invested than 
Denmark, leading an obstructionism bloc and cultivating resistance in the G7.82 Saudi policy 
began to shift somewhat in the early 2000s, as climate change concerns became increasingly 
severe.83 Even with that recognition of human responsibility, however, Saudi remained a 
roadblock during the 2009 Copenhagen conference, and continue to block advances during COP 
24 in 2018, in particular with the adoption of a UN IPCC report on environmental concerns.84 
Saudi Arabia continues to lead GCC countries in slowing down action on de-carbonization.85 
Unlike some Western democracies, which have integrated climate change into their national 
security discussion,86 Saudi Arabia seems to view its economic industrial base as a key 
component to its national security, so there will likely be resistance from the state’s security 
officials in enacting any policies that could threaten its lucrative oil industry. Its recent reforms 
and plans to invest in renewable energy however, if successful, may contribute to climate change 
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mitigation.87 Vision 2030 indicates clear intent of investment into a renewable energy industry. 
Technologies in water preservation have helped slow the water scarcity dilemma, and 
announcements concerning environmental concerns demonstrate a degree of political will in 
combating climate change in Saudi Arabia. However, these measures are contradicted at times 
by senior Saudi government officials, in their attempts to obstruct international green initiatives, 
particularly if they negatively impact the kingdom’s oil revenue. Despite some public messaging 
on the significance of diversifying their economy to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, Saudi 
remains focused on hard power funded by oil, their traditional economic industrial base. 
United States 
 The challenges presented by climate change to the United States are multi-faceted. Many 
countries are threatened by one specific type of climate problem such as desertification or 
flooding, but due to its geography, the U.S. faces a diverse range of disasters. Floods, drought 
and wildfires, and hurricanes can all hit the US within a given year. The effects of these types of 
events extend beyond the physical damage and harm to U.S. communities and into the sphere of 
national defense. Military installations across the U.S. are threatened by the damaging effects of 
storms, which have increased in both severity and frequency over the past decade. Threats to 
critical defense assets and infrastructure impact not only defense readiness, but the ability to 
project power during a particularly volatile era in global security.  
US Climate Trends 
 Floods are the United States’ most costly and destructive natural disaster.88 Given this, 
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serious risk is imposed in ignoring the observed trend of continuously rising sea levels. Scientists 
estimate that a one-meter rise in sea level would inundate 35,000 square kilometers (km2) of US 
land, and a 0.5 meter rise would inundate18, 000 km2.89 Coastal areas, particularly in the mid 
and south Atlantic states would be the most vulnerable. States on the western coast would be at 
lesser risk, although the San Francisco Bay area and the Puget Sound region would be 
exceptions. Many major US cities would be severely affected, to include New York and 
Washington, DC.90 Studies indicate the cumulative costs in defensive and emergency response 
measures of a one-meter rise in sea level by 2100 would be between $20 and $150 billion.91 
Rising sea levels would inundate several major, irreplaceable Department of Defense (DoD) 
facilities.92 While floods have been traditional threats to societies historically, increased global 
temperatures will increase their intensity and frequency.93 
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, wildfires and drought pose significant risks to 
western US states. 2017 and 2018 were record-breaking wildfire years in California. 2018 holds 
the record for the most destructive wildfire, the largest wildfire, and the costliest wildfire season 
in California state history.94 Although fires and drought present the opposite threat of floods, 
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these effects of climate change are interconnected. As temperatures and drought increased during 
California’s dry seasons leading up to 2017, the 2017-18 wet seasons also saw increased 
precipitation, producing more vegetation, which served as an increased source of fuel for follow 
on wildfires during the dry season.95 
 According to a 2019 DoD report, more than two-thirds of the military’s operationally 
critical installations are threatened by climate change.96 While the report did not assess all of its 
hundreds of installations, the Pentagon selected 79 bases that are considered mission essential 
based on their operational role. Of those, DoD reported that 53 of the 79 are threatened by 
flooding while 43 of the 79 face threats from drought and 36 face threats from wildfires.97 
Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida suffered extensive damage due to Hurricane Michael in 2018, 
with the storm damaging nearly every building on the base.98 In addition to threatening defense 
operational capabilities, damage to military installations carries an economic toll. After Offutt 
Air Force Base suffered severe flood damage in 2019, the Air Force estimated $420 million 
would be required to repair and rebuild facilities.99 The base’s runway, which houses aircraft for 
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 Each U.S. president from the onset of this research period has voiced positions on climate 
issues. Bill Clinton addressed the issue in his 2000 State of the Union, then known as Global 
Warming, announcing a significant budget increase to 2.4 billion dollars for global climate 
change concerns.100 George Bush gave a speech in the Rose Garden explaining his stance 
towards the dangerous precedents of the Kyoto Protocol. While still advancing the idea of 
climate concerns as important, he emphasized the need to balance environmental goals with 
economic ones.101  In a speech to Georgetown University students in 2013, Barak Obama 
described his efforts to have the EPA develop standards for carbon emissions, though he warned 
the audience to understand that a change from fossil fuels would have to come gradually, so as 
not to disrupt the economy.102 On the global stage, at the signing of the Paris Climate Accords, 
President Obama reminded the audience of his commitment to the issue during his inaugural 
address, and described the agreement as the realization of those initial aspirations.103 In contrast, 
the current Trump administration has been a vocal opponent of the Paris Climate Accords, and 
prompted the U.S. to withdraw from the agreement with a statement issued by Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo.104  
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Investments: 
 Starting in 2009, the DoD began to plan for significant changes in energy consumption 
by each of the military services. The Air Force sought an alternative petroleum blend for 50% of 
domestic aviation fuels, the Army sought out 500 non-tactical hybrid vehicles for domestic use, 
while the Navy ran a trial for the use of bio-fuel for the F/A-18 strike fighter.105 There are 
similarly efforts at the lower level, with states joining together to adopting policies that support 
environmental initiatives, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, with ten New 
England and Mid-Atlantic States adopted a self-imposed program aimed at reducing greenhouse 
gas.106 In their study on North American business strategies, Jones and Levy argue that 
businesses in the United States are rewarded for relatively small gains in environmental issues 
due to the nature of current federal policies.107  
Legislation: 
 In the early 1990s, prior to the focus area of this research, the United States drove climate 
innovation, with a significant shift towards economic concerns when President George H.W. 
Bush refused to attend the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro if pressured to commit to greenhouse gas emission targets.108 This trajectory 
continued under the Clinton Administration, when the United States Senate passed the Hagel-
Byrd Resolution with 95 votes to zero, confirming that the Senate would not support treaties with 
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mandatory gas emissions for the US that might harm the economy.109 With this background, it is 
unsurprising that when President George W. Bush was faced with the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, he 
was clear that the U.S. will not abide by the agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.110 
For it’s size and relative global power, the United States has very little legislation aimed at 
targeting climate change. The Clean Air Act, which the Trump Administration has actively 
undermined,111 is the most representative, however the bulk of the remaining legislation is 
focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy, including the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
the Energy, Independence and Security Act of 2007, and the Food, Conservation and Energy Act 
of 2008.112 While a related concern, energy legislation alone has not been effective in 
comprehensively tackling an issue on the scale of global climate change.   
 Part of this challenge is highlighted by research on ideological views of renewable energy 
legislation, as partisan perspectives shape priorities. In their research on the relationship between 
political ideology and support for renewable energy initiatives, Hess et al demonstrated that the 
reception of environmental policy instruments was directly related to the domestic political 
leaning of each state.113  In the United States, despite significant scientific consensus over the 
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dangers that climate change presents, legislation on the issue remains tied to divisive, party-
driven ideological frameworks.114 
National Security Policy:  
 The National Security policy of the United States will be traced through the Quadrennial 
Defense Reviews (QDR) produced by the Pentagon and current National Defense Policy. In 
2001, the QDR mentions the climate only once, referring for the potential of climate concerns to 
spurn future conflict.115 In 2006, the first QDR since the attacks of 9/11, the QDR makes no 
mention of climate concerns, instead focusing on the pressing challenge of confronting terrorism 
worldwide.116 By 2010, climate was a priority within the QDR, with a specific prong of reform 
titled “Crafting a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy,”117described as playing a crucial 
role in national security. The QDR of 2010 underscores the ways in which climate change will 
directly impact the DoD, including shaping the military’s operating environment,118 and the 
adjustments that DoD would have to prepare for in terms of facilities and military capabilities.119 
In their review of the 2010 QDR, Parthemore and Rogers emphasize the shift in the 2010 QDR, 
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and the recognition that energy security and climate change are associated security matters.120 By 
2014, the role of climate change was reduced in the QDR, discussing climate change as a 
challenge, but not listing it as a specific line of effort.121 It continues to emphasize the risk to 
DoD facilities, and brings the U.S. Arctic Strategy to the fore as both a security and climate 
issue.122 In 2018, the QDR transitioned into the National Defense Strategy, a classified 
document. The unclassified summary, made publically available, makes no mention of 
environmental concerns, but instead focuses on lethality and flexibility to deal with emerging 
threats- the kinds of issues that are more in line with traditional thinking about military power 
and national security.123 In addition, at the Executive branch level, the National Security Strategy 
of the U.S. released from the White House in 2017, makes no mention of climate change, nor 
does it mention renewable energy in any of its discussion on energy. The document does state 
that, “the United States will remain a global leader in reducing traditional pollution, as well as 
greenhouse gases, while expanding our economy.”124 The document goes on to state that energy 
efficiency gains will not come from “onerous regulations,”125 thus demonstrating a similar 
contradictory stance to Saudi Arabia, in acknowledging the issue, but in a limited capacity so as 
not to disrupt the economic/industrial base which profits from status-quo energy policy. For the 
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United States, the issue of climate change remains a point of political polarization. Though the 
defense and scientific communities have articulated the threat, policy is dependent on the 
political party in power.  
Conclusion 
 Though climate change is an ever-pressing challenge, it has not yet been universally 
adopted as a national security concern, in the way that the classical Realist international relations 
paradigm would categorize such a threat. In Denmark, despite the clear challenges in the Arctic, 
the public focus of climate change initiatives are underpinned with a collective societal 
responsibility rather than shaping an articulated security policy. This public narrative could shift 
in the coming years, as governmental response clearly recognizes the potential for conflict due to 
a warming Arctic. In Saudi Arabia, while the science has been acknowledged, short-term 
economic calculus sees threats to oil revenue as more significant than threats posed by climate 
change. Initiatives to tackle climate change are limited, as the Saudi oil-based economy is the 
source of Saudi political power and stability. Therefore, despite the environmental threat, the 
greater problem from a Saudi leadership perspective is the undermining of their oil-based 
economy due to global action to mitigate climate change. This viewpoint could be altered with 
the emergence of Prince Mohammed bin Salman, but the fluid status of the political climate in 
Saudi Arabia renders a conclusive assessment unachievable in the near term. In the United 
States, the issue of climate change has been articulated by both the scientific and defense 
research communities. Action or policy towards addressing it, however, has been stalled by 
domestic political agendas and varying opinions brought forth by different presidential 
administrations.  
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 In traditional Realist thinking, climate change is not a true national security threat. The 
contention is that when all issues become security issues (such as food, water, or cyber security), 
it creates a “securitization” of social problems that do not truly merit that categorization.126 This 
classical Realist approach, however, fails to acknowledge that hard power alone, will not 
overcome the challenges of climate change. To remain relevant in the 21st century, Realism must 
grow to incorporate unconventional threats to traditional power, which still prove to be 
existential. As Porter states, “The term, ‘national security’ has never had a precise definition, 
even during the Cold War.”127 Similarly, according to classical Realists such as Hobbes, security 
claims about what constitutes threats are complex and ultimately based off opinions rather than 
established truths and are thus subject to debate and disagreement.128 Hobbes views it as 
acceptable for security judgments and practices to emerge through democratic discussion, with 
the caveat that the assembly’s choice be taken as absolute.129 This echoes the flexibility 
Morgenthau advocates in ascertaining what defines national security and how the definition must 
adapt to the times and geopolitical situation, requiring states to sometimes act in concert for their 
collective good, even if the overall system is one of anarchy.130 Thus, from the time of Hobbes to 
modern day security strategists within Realism, it is ultimately inaccurate to point to traditional 
Realist thought as a means of downplaying threats other than hard power, so as to prevent them 
from being included in the national security field. If the outlooks from the scientific and defense 
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communities are accurate with respect to climate change, scholars of the modern Realist 
framework ought to achieve consensus as to how they will incorporate climate change into their 
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